NOTES
Tank v. State Farm: Conducting a Reservation
of Rights Defense in Washington
I.

INTRODUCTION

The key to properly conducting a reservation of rights
defense1 is understanding the interrelationship between
insurer, policyholder, and defense counsel. In Tank v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,2 the Washington Supreme Court
addressed the rights and duties of the insurer and defense
counsel conducting a reservation of rights defense. This case
drew interest from plaintiff and defense bar alike.3 Expressions of victory came from both sides,4 even though the opinion
of the court did not result in a change in the law. The court
simply drew upon existing statutory and case law, as well as
the Rules of Professional Conduct, to set out fairly explicit cri1. A reservation of rights defense occurs when a liability insurer elects to defend a
claim involving questionable coverage but reserves the right to later deny coverage.
See infra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
2. James D. Tank v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 38 Wash. App. 438, 686 P.2d
1127 (1984), rev'd, 105 Wash. 2d 381, 715 P.2d 1133 (1986).
This appeal was joined with Johnson v. Public Employees Mutual Ins. Co., 105
Wash. 2d 381, 715 P.2d 1133 (1986), to decide the rights of a third party claimant to sue
the liability carrier for bad faith refusal to indemnify. The tort claimant in Tank had
joined with Tank in his action against State Farm. This third party issue, as well as
Tank's claim of a violation of the Consumer Protection Act, will not be considered
here.
3. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington State Trial Lawyers Association, Tank,
105 Wash. 2d 381, 715 P.2d 1133 (1986) (Nos. 50994-8, 50933-6) [hereinafter Amicus
Brief WS.TL.A.]; Amicus Brief of Washington Association of Defense Counsel, Tank,
105 Wash. 2d 381, 715 P.2d 1133 (1986) (Nos. 50994-8, 50933-6) [hereinafter Amicus
Brief WA.D.C.].
4. Compare Kleist, 22 Trial News #3 p. 16 (November 1986) ("It is interesting to
note that Mr. Hickman was on the losing side of Tank v. State Farm. Apparently, Mr.
Hickman is not pleased by the supreme court's sensibilities to the fiduciary obligations
owed insureds by their insurance companies and attorneys.") with Hickman, The Tank
Case, 9th Annual W.S.T.L.A. Insurance Law Seminar, January 22, 1987 ("Wrong, Mr.
Kleist! On both counts. I was on the winning side of Tank.... I was very pleased by
the supreme court's vote of confidence.
...) and Hickman, Royal Globe, Cumis
Doctrines Rejected, For the Defense, September, 1986, at 8 ("(T]he court gave a
resounding vote of confidence to the defense bar.").

140

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 11:139

teria to be followed by insurer and defense counsel when conducting a reservation of rights defense. This criteria was
described as an "enhanced obligation of fairness" on the part of
the insurance company.5
The court reasoned that the enhanced obligation was necessary because of the potential conflict of interest inherent in a
reservation of rights defense. The court's conflict of interest
analysis corrected the appellate court's erroneous application
of the excess of limits conflict to the reservation of rights situation. The court did not, however, directly address important
collateral issues such as the insurer's vicarious liability for the
conduct of the insurer-retained defense counsel, the ability of
defense counsel to give undivided loyalty to the policyholder,
or the right to control the defense when an insurer reserves
the right to later contest coverage.
These collateral issues were either avoided outright or
addressed only by implication. While the court did not declare,
as have other courts, that the insurer-retained defense counsel
was incapable of acting independently, the imposition of the
enhanced obligation cannot be viewed as an unqualified vote of
confidence for insurer and defense counsel.
A.

The Liability Policy

The typical liability insurance policy imposes two duties on
the insurer when presented with a claim for which coverage
applies. First, the insurer has the duty to indemnify by paying
all amounts that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay,
up to the policy limits.6 Second, the insurer must defend any
such suit brought against the insured even if the suit is ground5. Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 387, 715 P.2d at 1137.
6. The homeowner's policy that State Farm sold to Tank provided:
Coverage L - PERSONAL LIABILITY
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for damages
because of bodily injury or property damage to which this coverage applies,
we will:
a. Pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the insured
is legally liable; and
b. Provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice. We may
make any investigation and settle any claim or suit that we decide is
appropriate. Our obligation to defend any claim or suit ends when the
amount we pay for damages resulting from the occurrence equals our limit of
liability.
Respondent's Brief at 1, Tank, 38 Wash. App. 438, 686 P.2d 1127 (1984) (No. 5526-111-4),
rev'd, 105 Wash. 2d 381, 715 P.2d 1133 [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
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less, false or fraudulent.7 The duty to defend can be described
as broader than the duty to indemnify. 8 This is so because the
insurer may be required to defend an insured even if the
insurer will never be called upon to indemnify for that particular claim or suit.9
When the claim is presented, the liability insurer must
determine if it has a duty to defend. The general rule is that
the duty is determined from the facts alleged in the complaint.' ° The insurer must defend when any facts alleged, if
proved, would fall within the provisions of the insurance contract. This general rule has been the object of several exceptions by the courts. Because of changes in pleading practices,
for example, the allegations may be too vague for the insurer
to precisely know if the policy provisions provide coverage."
Alternative allegations may be pled with one allegation clearly
covered and the other not. 2 While the allegations may not fall
within the policy provisions, the insurer may be aware of facts
that bring the suit within the terms of the policy. 3 On the
other hand, the third party claimant may assert allegations
that are covered even though the facts are not supportive, just
7. C. APPELMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE (Berdal ed.), § 4682 [hereinafter
APPELMAN] ("Accordingly, the insurer is bound to defend the insured against suits
alleging facts and circumstances covered by the policy, even though such suits are
groundless, false or fraudulent.").
8. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Coronet Ins. Co., 44 Ill. App. 3d 744, 748, 358
N.E.2d 914, 917 (1976).
9. Suppose, for example, that an insured is sued for allegedly causing an auto
accident. Even though investigation reveals that the insured was out of town at the
time of the accident, and therfore the insurer will never have to indemnify, a defense
must still be provided for the insured by the insurer. See generally, KEETON,
INSURANCE LAW (1971) § 7.6 [hereinafter KEETON].
10. Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. National Indem. Co., 75 Wash. 2d 909, 911, 454 P.2d 383
(1969) ("the insurer's duty to defend, unlike its duty to pay, arises when the complaint
is filed and is to be determined from the allegations of the complaint."); Western
National Assurance Co. v. Hecker, 43 Wash. App. 816, 820, 719 P.2d 954, 957 (1986). See
also Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 45 Wash. App. 111, 115, 724
P.2d 418, 420 (1986) (pleadings must be liberally construed if facts alleged would
render the insurer liable under the policy).
11. R. A. Hanson Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 26 Wash. App. 290, 294, 612 P.2d 456, 459
(1980) ("Thus, modern rules of notice pleading, which do not require the definiteness
of former rules, may change the general rules. There is greater duty placed on the
insurer to determine if there are any facts which could fall within the pleadings, thus
giving rise to an obligation to defend."). See also Nat'l Steel Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Union
Fire Ins., 14 Wash. App. 573, 543 P.2d 642 (1975).
12. The obvious example is alleging both intentional acts (not covered by policy)
and negligent acts (covered by policy). See APPLEMAN at § 4683, 53.
13. Hanson, 26 Wash. App. at 294, 612 P.2d at 459 (citing Ross Island Sand &
Gravel Co. v. General Ins. Co. of America, 472 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1973)).
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to make sure that the insurer is involved. 1 4 With these exceptions, the general rule of comparing the suit to the policy does
not always guarantee certainty when determining coverage.
This uncertainty of coverage is the reason that an insurance company reserves the right to later dispute coverage.
Any analysis concerning the reservation of rights defense must
be premised on the fact that coverage is uncertain and that the
policyholder may not be insured for the particular claim or suit
being presented.1 5
B.

The Insurer's Options When Coverage is Uncertain

Liability insurers have four distinct options when
presented with a claim involving uncertain coverage. First, the
insurer can unconditionally provide coverage. Second, the
insurer can, following appropriate investigation, decide that
coverage does not apply and deny the claim. Third, the insurer
can, in appropriate cases, institute a declaratory action and let
the courts decide the coverage question. Finally, the liability
insurer has the option of conducting a reservation of rights
defense.
1.

Unconditional Coverage of the Claim

Even if the liability insurer has doubts about coverage, the
insurer can, nevertheless, assume the defense of the claim or
suit and be prepared to pay any settlement or judgment on
behalf of the insured. 16 The unconditional acceptance of the
claim may be advantageous since such acceptance preserves
the insurer's rights under the policy." These rights include
full control of the defense," the right to select defense coun14. Browne, The Demise of the Declaratory Judgment Action as a Device for
Testing the Insurer's Duty to Defend, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 423, 424 (1974).

15. This article will only refer to the policyholder as an "insured" when coverage
is acknowledged by the insurer. The courts and commentators often use the term
"insured" to describe a policyholder that has questionable coverage or no coverage at

all for the claim in question. This is misleading because without coverage the
policyholder is not insured for that claim.
16. If the insurer decides that its arguments against coverage are too weak, it may
just decide that it is better to provide unconditional coverage. See Comment,
Insurance Company's Dilemma: Defending Actions Against the Assured, 2 STAN. L.
REV. 383, 383-85 (1950).
17. 1A R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE 5.17-18 (1986) [hereinafter
LONG].
18. APPLEMAN, supra note 7, at § 4681.
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sel,' the privilege to settle when expedient,2 ° and the option,
within the bounds of good faith, to take the case to trial.2 '
These are powerful rights, thus the insurer may well decide
that it is preferable to accept a claim involving uncertain coverage in order to preserve them.
2.

Denial of Coverage

Where the company investigates and concludes that
neither the allegations nor the facts of the claim or suit fall
within the terms of the policy, the claim can be denied.2 2 The
policyholder is then left to depend on his own resources for
both indemnity and defense. The policyholder is, however,
free of the policy provisions and able to take whatever action
desired. 23 This includes settling the claim, litigating the matter, or even allowing a default judgment. 2 4 The policyholder's
choice is of no consequence to the insurer so long as no coverage exists.2 5
It has been said, however, that the insurer denies coverage
at its peril.26 If the company wrongfully denies coverage, the
consequences can be serious, especially if the insured can later
demonstrate bad faith on the part of the insurer.27 Thus, when
coverage is questionable, the insurer may be reluctant to deny
coverage outright.
19. Roos, The Obligation to Defend and Some Related Problems, 13 HASTINGS L.J.

206, 206-207 (1961) [hereinafter Roos].
20. This right is secured by the terms of the policy. See id.
21. APPELMAN, supra note 7, at § 4712. See also, Hamilton v. State Farm Mut.

Automobile Ins. Co., 9 Wash. App. 180, 189, 511 P.2d 1020, 1025 (1973) (Horowitz, C.J.,
dissenting).
22. Burnham v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 10 Wash. 2d 624, 631, 117 P.2d 644,
647 (1941)

(insurer "owed a duty to . . . investigate the facts and circumstances

surrounding the accident ...

and, if that investigation disclosed liability on the part of

the assured, it was the duty of the ...

insurer to make a good faith attempt to effect

settlement.").
23. Steinlage and Higgins, Duty to Defend: the Insurer'sPerspective, 3 DEF. RES.
INST. 37, 43, 44 (1978) [hereinafter Steinlage and Higgins].
24. Roos, supra note 19, at 206-7.

25. Waite v. Aetnas Cas. & Surety Co., 77 Wash. 2d 850, 855, 467 P.2d 847, 851
(1970) ("where the insurer refuses to defend a lawsuit on the ground that the claim
alleged is not covered by the policy, and the claim is in fact one not covered, the
insurer is not responsible for the insured's expenses in defending the suit.").
26. Roos, supra note 19, at 207 ("If the company has guessed wrong, it may

ultimately have to pay a judgment considerably larger than it would have had to pay
had it defended through its own counsel.").
27. Bad faith on the part of the insurer can expose the company to awards in
excess of policy limits. See Hamilton v. State Farm, 83 Wash. 2d 787, 791, 523 P.2d 193,
196 (1974).
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The Declaratory Action

An insurer faced with a claim to which coverage is uncertain can petition the courts to resolve the coverage question. 28
Insurers of all types can use this action to resolve such issues
as whether a contract was ever created, whether the policyholder has fulfilled the required conditions of the policy,
whether the loss occurred while the policy was in effect, or
whether other insurance coverage should take precedence.2 9
The declaratory action is uniquely restricted in its application to liability insurance. The insurer generally cannot use
such an action to resolve coverage disputes that turn on the
30
very facts to be determined in the underlying tort suit. Thus,

where the issue of a policyholder's liability to a third party
claimant and the issue of coverage both depend on the same
facts, the courts will not preempt the underlying tort action
with a declaratory judgment. 1 It is when faced with this type
of situation that the liability insurer is likely to utilize the
fourth option.
4.

The Reservation of Rights Defense

The liability insurer, when presented with a claim of questionable coverage, can investigate and defend the claim or suit
but reserve the right to later decline to indemnify.3 2 This
option is the middle ground between outright denial of coverage and the unconditional acceptance of the claim. Uncondi28. See Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 7.24.010 (1987).

See also National Indemnity Co. v. Smith-Gandy Inc., 50 Wash. 2d 124, 128, 309 P.2d
742, 744 (1957).
29. See Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Willrich, 13 Wash. 2d 263, 124 P.2d 950 (1942);
Associated Indem. Corp. v. Wachsmith, 2 Wash. 2d 679, 99 P.2d 420 (1940).
30. Note, The Role of DeclaratoryRelief and Collateral Estoppel in Determining
the Insurer's Duty to Defend and Indemnify, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 191, 196 (1969).
31. This issue has not been resolved in Washington. See Western National

Assurance Co. v. Hecker, 43 Wash. App. at 821-22 n.1, 719 P.2d at 958 n.1 ("Were the
circumstances otherwise, we

would question the

trial court's resolution

of the

underlying factual issues. Although this issue has not been addressed directly in
Washington, a number of courts in other states have held that if an injured party sues

the insured and the insurer seeks a declaratory judgment concerning coverage, the
court in the declaratory judgment action cannot determine the ultimate question of

the insured's liability or the facts upon which such liability is based. See, e.g.,
Thornton v. Paul, 74 Ill. 2d 132, 384 N.E.2d 335 (1979); Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins.
Co., 276 Md. 396, 347 A.2d 842 (1975); Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 103 R.I. 623, 240
A.2d 397 (1968)."). The closest case in Washington is Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. National
Indem. Co., 75 Wash. 2d at 914, 454 P.2d at 386, where the court was concerned with
duplication of litigation.

32. Associated Indem. Corp. v. Wachsmith, 2 Wash. 2d 679, 99 P.2d 420 (1940).
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tional investigation and defense can act as a waiver to the right
to dispute coverage 33 or the company can be estopped from
later asserting the right by real or presumed prejudice to the
policyholder. 34 The insurer, by explicitly reserving this right,
is forestalling both the possibility of implied waiver and prejudice as well as putting the policyholder on notice of the coverage issue. At the same time, the insurer is going forward with
its investigation and defense of the claim or suit. Thus, the
policyholder is receiving the benefit of company sponsored
defense despite the uncertain coverage. The reservation of
rights defense, as opposed to outright denial, provides a service
to the policyholder who otherwise would have to totally bear
the burden of defending the claim.3 5
Notice, preferably in writing, must be communicated to
the policyholder in a timely fashion and specifically identify
the coverage issues that the insurer wishes to preserve. 6 If the
company and its policyholder end up in a lawsuit over the coverage issue, the nature and content of the reservation of rights
notice may come under substantial judicial scrutiny. Hence,
the notice must be sufficient to put the policyholder on notice
and avoid an implied waiver.3 7
The problem of the content and the timing of the notice is
not nearly as formidable as the problem of the relationship
between the parties once the notice has been given. It was this
problem that the court addressed in Tank.
C. Tank v. State Farm
In Tank v. State Farm,3" the court analyzed the relationship between insurer, policyholder, and defense counsel and
discussed this relationship when a reservation of rights defense
33. Comment, Insurance Company's Dilemma: Defending Actions Against the
Assured, 2 STAN. L. REV. 383 (1950).

34. Bosko v. Pitts & Still, Inc., 75 Wash. 2d 856, 454 P.2d 229 (1969) (must have
prejudice for estoppel); Transamerica Ins. Group v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 16 Wash. App.
247, 252, 554 P.2d 1080, 1083 (1976) ("The course cannot be rerun, no amount of
evidence will prove what might have occurred if a different route had been taken....
Of necessity, this establishes prejudice."). See also Comment, Insurance Policy
Defenses and CollateralEstoppel, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 140 (1968).
35. Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 390, 715 P.2d at 1139.
36. See Note, The Reservation of Rights Notice by Insurers, 19 S.C.L. REV. 210
(1967); Steinlage and Higgins, supra note 23, at 39-40; Associated Indem. Corp. v.
Wachsmith, 2 Wash. 2d at 692-93, 99 P.2d at 426 (Nothing in statutes or cases requires a
particular format to put policyholder on notice).
37. For a sample Reservation of Rights Letter, see LONG, supra note 17, App. B.
38. 105 Wash. 2d 381, 715 P.2d 1133 (1986).
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is undertaken. The court reasoned that since potential conflicts of interest were inherent in this type of defense, the
insurer had an enhanced duty of good faith toward the policyholder. 9 The court's finding of an enhanced duty would
appear to be a departure from prior decisions that have held
the insurer to the same duty toward a policyholder being
defended under a reservation of rights as toward an insured
being defended unconditionally.4 °
Tank arose from the underlying case of Walker v. Tank.4 1
The facts in this underlying action provide an excellent example of a liability claim with uncertain coverage that cannot be
resolved by a declaratory action. Tank and another man,
Walker, had an argument that ended when Tank punched
Walker to the ground. Tank then kicked Walker about the
head and face, which put Walker into the hospital for two days
and permanently impaired his sense of taste and smell.4 2
Walker sued Tank alleging battery and demanding damages. Tank, through his personal attorney, tendered the
defense of the suit to his homeowners insurer, State Farm Fire
and Casualty Company. State Farm had issued a policy to
Tank that, in part, promised to pay all sums for which Tank
might become legally obligated to pay for personal injuries
that Tank might cause. 43 The policy also promised to provide a
defense at company expense by counsel chosen by the
insurer.44
Presented with a request for coverage from a policyholder,
State Farm could have exercised any one of the four options
previously discussed. 45 First, State Farm could have unconditionally accepted the claim and defended and indemnified as
needed. The homeowner's policy, however, specifically
excluded claims arising out of the intentional acts of the policyholder.46 Since the possibility of intentional injury, as
alleged in the complaint, was very real, a coverage question
39. Id. at 387-88, 715 P.2d at 1137.
40. Van Dyke v. White, 55 Wash. 2d 601, 349 P.2d 430 (1960); Weber v. Biddle, 4
Wash. App. 519, 483 P.2d 155 (1971).
41. Walker v. Tank, Asotin County Superior Court, Case No. 15389.
42. Tank, 38 Wash. App. at 440, 686 P.2d at 1129.
43. See supra note 6.
44. Id.
45. The four options were unconditional acceptance, outright denial, the
declaratory action, and the reservation of rights defense. See supra notes 16-37 and
accompanying text.
46. The State Farm policy contained the following exclusion:
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existed. Hence, State Farm, in the face of this uncertainty, was
reluctant to unconditionally accept the claim.47
The second option was for the company to deny the claim.
Following the general rule, which is to compare the allegations
of the suit to the policy provisions, it becomes instantly apparent that the claim should be denied outright because State
Farm would not have to pay a judgment for an intentional
tort-the only allegation of the suit. Some jurisdictions, however, have found a duty to defend when self-defense is claimed
since, if the case were truly one of self-defense, the injuries
were not "intentional" and the allegations became "ground48
less" and "false.

The third option was the declaratory action. The company
could have petitioned the court to decide if coverage applied to
this claim. However, the facts that would decide whether
Tank had acted intentionally, and thus was liable to Walker,
would also decide if there was coverage for the claim. Hence,
this claim was inappropriate for a declaratory action.
State Farm chose the fourth option and agreed to defend
the action while reserving the right to later deny coverage
should it turn out that Tank had acted intentionally. The company notified Tank and his personal attorney by letter.4 9
State Farm hired an attorney to represent Tank and
retained separate counsel to represent the company's interest
in the coverage issue.5" Following the depositions of Tank and
Walker, the insurer-provided attorney evaluated the case in a
letter addressed to State Farm with a copy sent to Tank.5 ' The
attorney felt that the self-defense argument was weak and that
Walker would likely prevail with his battery allegation. The
damage award was estimated to run as high as ten to twelve
1. Coverage L Personal Liability and Coverage M - Medical
Payments to Others do not apply to:
a. bodily injury or property damage which is expected or intended.
Respondent's Brief, supra note 6, at 2.
47. Unconditional acceptance of the claim might act as a waiver of policy defenses.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
48. Grey v. Zurich Ins. Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 419 P.2d 168 (1966); Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Novak, 210 Neb. 184, 313 N.W.2d 636 (1981).
49. Tank, 38 Wash. App. at 439, 686 P.2d at 1128.
50. Tank, 105 Wash. 2d 381, 715 P.2d 1133.
51. A copy of this letter was attached to the Brief of State Farm in Response to
Brief of W.A.D.C. Brief of State Farm in Response To Brief of W.A.D.C. at app. A-i,
Tank, 105 Wash. 2d 381, 715 P.2d 1133 (1986) (No. 5526-111-4) [hereinafter Brief of State
Farm in Response to W.A.D.C.].
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thousand dollars.2
The case was tried before a judge who concluded that
Tank had intentionally and without justification battered
Walker. The damages awarded were just over $16,000. 5 3 State

Farm refused to pay, pointing to the policy exclusion. Tank
then sued State Farm.54
In Tank's suit, the trial court held, as a matter of law, that
no coverage could be found in Tank's homeowner policy for
battery. 5 Since State Farm was not liable to Tank for intentionl acts under the policy, the court granted State Farm's
motion to dismiss the action.5 6
The appellate court reversed, holding that State Farm,
having undertaken Tank's defense, had a duty to make a good
faith attempt to settle the claim once Tank's liability became
reasonably apparent. 57 The court pointed to cases that had
held insurers to a duty to settle within policy limits when coverage was clear but the insured was faced with a claim potentially in excess of policy limits.58 Since the court felt that the
alleged facts created a breach of duty question, the court
reversed the summary judgment as to Tank's allegations of
breach of duty. 9 State Farm appealed to the Washington
Supreme Court.
The supreme court addressed the issue of the insurer's
duty of good faith when defending under a reservation of
rights. The court held that the insurer's duty of good faith
included an enhanced obligation of fairness toward the policyholder when the company was defending under a reservation
of rights.6 ° Underlying the enhanced obligation of fairness is
the potential conflict of interest inherent in this type of
52. Id.
53. Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 384, 715 P.2d at 1135.
54. Tank "sued State Farm for breach of duty of good faith. His complaint alleged
that State Farm failed to make reasonable efforts to settle the Walker claim and that
State Farm subordinated Tank's interests to its own interests by structuring a defense
which would absolve State Farm of liability under Tank's insurance policy." 105 Wash.
2d at 385, 715 P.2d at 1135.
55. Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 385, 715 P.2d at 1135.
56. Id.
57. Tank, 38 Wash. App. at 446, 686 P.2d at 1132.
58. Id. at 442, 686 P.2d at 1130 (citing Hamilton v. State Farm, 83 Wash. 2d 787, 523
P.2d 193 (1974); Burnham v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 10 Wash. 2d 624, 117 P.2d
644 (1941); Tyler v. Grange Ins. Ass'n., 3 Wash. App. 167, 473 P.2d 193 (1970)). All
three of these cases involved excess of limits situations.
59. Tank, 38 Wash. App. at 443, 686 P.2d at 1132.
60. Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 383, 715 P.2d at 1135.
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defense. Before analyzing this enhanced obligation, it is important to make an analysis of conflicts of interest in the insurance defense setting.
D.

Conflicts of Interest

When an insurer defends the insured, the interests of the
two are usually the same.6 Both seek to avoid liability or, if
necessary, to settle the claim. In the usual case, only the
insurer's funds are at stake, thus the insurer makes the decisions regarding the handling of the claim or suit.6 2 Once coverage is acknowledged and the legal liability of the insured
becomes reasonably clear, the company is bound by its duty to
the insured to attempt to settle with the third party.63 If liabil-

ity is questionable, or if the demands by the third party are
unreasonable, the insurer can, within the bounds of good faith,
elect to go to trial.' So long as the interests of insurer and
insured are the same, the relationship problems are minimal.
The identity of interests can diverge, however, and, at
some point, conflict. A typical example of a conflict of interest
is the excess of limits situation.6 5 The excess of limits conflict
arises when it is probable that the insured has caused damage
to a third party in excess of his policy limits but the third party
claimant is willing to settle for those limits. Assuming that
settlement is only possible at or near policy limits, the insurer
has little to lose by taking the case to trial.6 6 If the insured is
found not liable or liable for less than the policy limits, the
insurer will have saved money. If the judgment is in excess of
61. Knepper, Conflict of Interest in Defending Insurance Cases, 19 DEF. L.J. 515
(1970).
62. Maines, Legal and Contractual Relationship in Insurance Liability Defense
Cases, 37 INS. COUNSEL J. 5 (Oct. 1970).

63. Burnham, 10 Wash. 2d 624, 117 P.2d 644; Evan v. Continental Casualty Co., 40
Wash. 2d 614, 245 P.2d 470 (1952); Hamilton v. State Farm Ins. Co., 83 Wash. 2d at 791,
523 P.2d at 196.
64. Tyler v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 3 Wash. App. 167, 172, 473 P.2d 193, 197 (1970)
("The typical liability insurance policy contains no express provision requiring the
insurer to settle and gives the company control over the defense of the claim and
control over the decision concerning opportunities of settlement within policy
coverage. The existence of this control of defense and settlement is a necessity of
insurance practice, but, with this power given the insurer, the courts have stated there
is a duty sounding in tort requiring the insurer to give consideration to the interests of
the insured, when negotiating a settlement.").
65. Annotation, Duty of Liability Insurer to Settle or Compromise, 40 A.L.R. 2d
168 (1955).
66. See excess of limits cases cited at supra note 58. See also KEETON, supra note
9, at § 7.8 (a).
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the policy limits, the company can simply pay the limits and
leave the excess for the insured to pay.67 Obviously, this strategy risks the financial well-being of the insured, which is the
very well-being that the insured was attempting to preserve by
purchasing the policy. As a result of this type of conflict, the
courts have imposed on the insurer first both a duty to refrain
from placing its interest above that of the insured, 8 and a duty
to effect settlement when liability becomes reasonably clear,69
as well as a penalty for bad faith claim handling, which makes
the insurer responsible for the entire judgment, even in excess
70
of the policy limits.
The supreme court in Tank observed that a potential conflict of interest is inherent in every reservation of rights
defense. 7 ' The appellate court also considered the potential
conflict but applied the case law that had been formulated for
the excess of limits conflict. 72 The appellate court felt that the
excess limits rationale was "equally applicable" to the conflict
potential in a reservation of rights defense.7 3 This application
of the excess of limits conflict to the reservation of rights
defense ignores the distinction between the two types of conflicts. In one situation, the conflict arises because the insurance purchased by the insured may be inadequate to pay the
entire judgment; in the other situation, the conflict arises
because the insurance purchased may be inapplicable to the
claim.
The excess of limits conflict is not directly applicable to
the reservation of rights conflict because a policyholder might
not be covered under the terms of the policy and, therefore,
not an insured. 74 The conflict arises because the insurer is
reluctant to provide coverage in an uncertain coverage situation, while the policyholder desires unconditional commitment
to defend and indemnify. Since the company, defending under
a reservation of rights, still controls the defense, there is concern that the insurer might tailor the defense in such a way as
67. KEETON, supra note 9, at 509.
68. Tyler, 3 Wash. App. at 174, 473 P.2d at 199.
69. Burnham, 10 Wash. 2d at 631, 117 P.2d at 647.
70. Hamilton, 83 Wash. 2d at 791, 523 P.2d at 196.
71. Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 387-88, 715 P.2d at 1137.
72. See supra note 58.
73. Tank, 38 Wash. App. at 443, 686 P.2d at 1130.
74. See Brief of State Farm in Response to W.A.D.C. supra note 51, at 6-9 (where
there is no coverage, there is no duty to settle).
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to avoid coverage.75
The appellate court's imposition of a duty to settle when
liability of the insured is reasonably clear, makes good sense
when applied to acknowledged coverage situations, yet makes
little sense when applied to questionable coverage situations.
The duty to settle is not appropriate where coverage is uncertain because such a duty would render the reservation of rights
useless and leave the insurer in the position of unconditional
acceptance.76 The policyholder could demand that the insurer
settle a claim, with company money, once liability of the policyholder became reasonably clear even though coverage was
still uncertain.
All will agree that Mr. Tank did not purchase his homeowner's policy so that State Farm would be available to pay for
damages resulting from battery.7 7 Since a declaratory action
was unavailable, imposing a duty to settle, even in the face of
uncertain coverage, would have left State Farm with two
unpalatable options at the outset. State Farm could have, at its
peril, denied coverage and hoped that the court would find an
intentional tort.7' Alternatively, the company could have
assumed the unconditional defense of Mr. Tank and been prepared to attempt settlement when Tank's liability became reasonably clear. The first option leaves the policyholder without
a company-sponsored defense that he may deserve. The second
option forces the insurer to pay for claims that may not be
covered.
The duty to settle in a known coverage case must be distinguished from the duty of an insurer in a reservation of
rights case. The supreme court recognized this distinction by
pointing out that "[i]n a reservation of rights defense, it is the
insured who might have to pay any judgment or settlement.
Therefore, it is the insured who must make the ultimate choice
regarding settlement."7 9 This language rejects the appellate
court's application of the duty to settle in an excess of limits
75. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers, 64 Ill.2d 187, 355 N.E.2d 24 (1976).
76. See Brief of State Farm In Response To Brief of W.S.T.L.A. at 12-14, Tank, 105

Wash. 2d 381, 715 P.2d 1133 (Nos. 50933-6, 50994-8) [hereinafter Brief of State Farm in
Response To W.S.T.L.A.].
77. Public policy will not allow insuring such events.
78. See Roos, supra note 19, at 206-07 ("An insurance company which refuses to
defend a claim made against its insured upon the grounds that the claim does not fall
within its coverage, acts at its peril. If it makes an incorrect decision, the consequences
are serious.").
79. Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 389, 715 P.2d at 1138.
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situation to the reservation of rights defense. If the company
has a duty to settle, the policyholder cannot make the ultimate
choice regarding settlement; the choice remains with the
insurer. Since the insurer is not likely to settle until both liability and coverage become reasonably clear, the policyholder
is at risk because the coverage issue may be decided against
him. The policyholder must be allowed to minimize this personal exposure by settling the case if he so decides."0 The
insurer, still uncertain whether coverage applies, is allowed to
take the case to trial for a determination of the facts that will
decide both the liability issue and the coverage question. The
right to dispute coverage, following this determination, will
have been preserved by the reservation of rights notice.
Of course, the insurer cannot, in good faith, conduct the
reservation of rights defense in such a manner as to be prejudicial to the policyholder.8 " According to the supreme court, the
potential conflict of interest "inherent in this type of defense
mandate[s] an even higher standard: an insurance company
must fulfill an enhanced obligation to its insured as part of its
duty of good faith." 2
E.

The Enhanced Obligation

The supreme court in Tank addressed the issue of the
insurer's duty of good faith when defending under a reservation of rights. The court focused first on the evolution of the
80. The insured can always settle the claim and then sue the insurer for coverage.
This tactic worked well in Hering v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 50 Wash. 2d 321, 311
P.2d 674 (1957). The insured was sued for assault and battery but claimed self-defense.
The insurer refused to defend so the insured settled and then sued to prove selfdefense. The court accepted the self-defense argument and held that the insurer had
breached its duty to defend and must pay the reasonable settlement.
81. Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 387, 715 P.2d at 1137 (quoting Weber v. Biddle, 4 Wash.
App. 519, 524, 483 P.2d 155 (1971) ("A reservation of rights agreement is not a license
for an insurer to conduct the defense of an action in a manner other than it would
normally be required to defend. The basic obligation of the insurer to the insured
remains in effect.")).
82. Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 387, 715 P.2d at 1137. It is fundamental that the insurer
is the fiduciary of the policyholder. The insurer must exercise good faith in all
dealings with the policyholder. The concept of an enhanced obligation raises the
question of how the insurer, already a fiduciary charged with a standard of good faith
and fair dealing, can be any more fair toward, or careful with, the interests of the
policyholder. The courts will be called upon to gauge the fairness of the insurer in a
reservation of rights situation. Conceivably, the insurer could be found to have been
fair to the policyholder but not fair enough to avoid a breach of duty. The courts will
have to decide among shades of fairness as opposed to simply fairness or the absence of
fairness.
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duty of good faith imposed on insurers in Washington. Next,
the court considered this duty in a reservation of rights context
and finally, the court applied the good faith duty under the
reservation of rights to the facts of the case.
The duty of an insurer to act in good faith has been formulated by judicial decisions, 3 legislative enactment, 4 and
administrative regulation. 85 The duty of good faith and the liability for bad faith "usually refer[s] to the same obligation"8 "
and is used interchangeably by Washington courts. The court
explained the source of this duty:
However, regardless of whether a good faith duty in the
realm of insurance is cast in the affirmative or the negative,
the source of the duty is the same. That source is the fiduciary relationship existing between the insurer and insured.
Such a relationship exists not only as a result of the contract
between the insurer and insured, but because of the high
stakes involved for both parties to an insurance contract and
the elevated level of trust underlying insureds' dependence
88
on their insurers.
The court then considered this good faith duty in the context of a reservation of rights defense. It was noted in Tank
that two cases in Washington dealt with this issue and both
held that the same duty of good faith, regardless of the type of
defense, was applicable.8 9 The supreme court in Tank departed
from this standard by ruling that, given the potential conflicts
of interest inherent in the reservation of rights defense, the
insurer must fulfill an "enhanced obligation" to the policyholder.9 ° The court described "specific criteria" that an insurer
must follow while conducting the defense, in order to fulfill its
enhanced obligation.
First, the company must thoroughly investigate the
cause of the insured's accident and the nature and severity
of the plaintiff's injuries. Second, it must retain competent
defense counsel for the insured. Both retained defense cour83. See Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 386, 715 P.2d at 1136, and the cases cited therein.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

WASH. REv. CODE § 48.01.010 (1987).
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-300 (1986).
Tyler, 3 Wash. App. at 173, 473 P.2d at 197.
Murray v. Mossman, 56 Wash. 2d 909, 355 P.2d 985 (1960).
Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 385, 715 P.2d at 1136.
Van Dyke, 55 Wash. 2d 601, 349 P.2d 430; Weber, 4 Wash. App. 519, 483 P.2d

155.
90. Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 387-88, 715 P.2d at 1137.
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sel and the insurer must understand that only the insured is
the client. Third, the company has the responsibility for
fully informing the insured not only of the reservation of
rights defense itself, but of all developments relevant to his
policy coverage and the progress of his lawsuit. Information
regarding progress of the lawsuit includes disclosure of all
settlement offers made by the company. Finally, an insurance company must refrain from engaging in any action
which would demonstrate a greater concern for the insurer's
91
monetary interest than for the insured's financial risk.
When the criteria are compared to the then existing law in
Washington, it becomes apparent that the court's decision did
not result in a real change in the rights and duties of the
insurer, policyholder, or defense counsel. Since State Farm
complied with its duty of good faith to Tank as it existed at the
time and since the enhanced obligation resulted in no substantial change in the duty, the trial court's summary judgment in
favor of State Farm was upheld. This is seen when the criteria
are compared to the facts of Tank.
92
The first criterion is that of a thorough investigation.
Any time a liability insurer is presented with a claim, it must
investigate. 93 The decisions regarding defense, settlement, and
indemnification must be made with sufficient knowledge in
order to safeguard company and policyholder alike. Failure to
properly investigate will lead to the granting of coverage
where not deserved and denial of coverage where deserved.
Given the fiduciary relationship of insurer to insured the
courts are ready, and rightfully so, to penalize insurers who,
94
for lack of proper investigation, wrongfully deny coverage,
9
fail to settle, 95 or conduct an inadequate or improper defense. '
The case law prior to Tank was clear: an insurer had to
investigate.
In Tank, no claim was asserted that State Farm or defense
counsel failed to adequately investigate. The insurer-retained
defense counsel gathered sufficient information to correctly
91. Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 388, 715 P.2d at 1137.
92. Id.
93. Tyler, 3 Wash. App. at 179, 473 P.2d at 200-01 ("The insured has the duty to
thoroughly investigate to determine the facts upon which a good faith judgment as to
the settlement can be formulated and its failure to do so properly may evidence a lack
of good faith.").
94. Hering, 50 Wash. 2d 321, 311 P.2d 674.
95. Hamilton, 83 Wash. 2d 787, 523 P.2d 193.
96. KEETON, supra note 9, at § 7.6 (b).
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predict that the court would find that Tank had committed
battery.9 7 The estimate on the damages likely to be awarded
was lower than the outcome 98 even though the estimate
assumed that Walker had an impaired sense of taste and
smell. 99 Failure to accurately estimate a court award does not
amount to improper investigation, though poor investigation
can certainly result in inaccurate estimates. 0 0
The second criterion is that the insurer, in a reservation of
rights defense, must hire competent defense counsel with the
understanding that only the policyholder is the client.'0 1 This
requirement existed in Washington long before Tank. °2
Indeed, State Farm had retained an attorney to defend Tank
while retaining separate counsel to represent the company
regarding the coverage question. It was alleged, however, that
the attorney considered both Tank and State Farm as his clients. 10 3 In the usual no-conflict situation, a single attorney
often protects the interests of both insurer and insured. 04
Since, however, potential conflict of these interests is inherent
in a reservation of rights defense, separate attorneys must be
retained and each attorney must know which interests he is to
97. The evaluation letter by Tank's insurer provided attorney predicted that the
court would find liability. See Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 384, 715 P.2d at 1135.
98. Tank's attorney estimated the high range would be $10,000.00 to $12,000.00.
The judgment was just over $16,000.00. Tank, 38 Wash. App. at 441, 686 P.2d at 1129.
99. Tank's attorney had assumed that Walker would be able to prove a loss of the
sense of taste and smell when he made his award estimates. I at 440, 686 P.2d at
1129. This writer has attempted also to put a monetary figure on such a loss. Not only
is the nature of the loss especially intangible, but, since the loss is purely subjective,
the cooperation of the claimant is needed in order to even document that the loss has
occurred.
100. A good example is found in Tyler, 3 Wash. App. 167, 473 P.2d 193, where the
insurer failed to examine the claimant's medical records or secure independent
medical examination. An excess verdict resulted and the insurer was held liable for
the entire judgment.
101. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Van Dyke, 55 Wash. 2d 601, 349 P.2d 430; Weber, 4 Wash. App. at
524, 483 P.2d at 159 ("A reservation of rights agreement is not a license for an insurer
to conduct the defense of an action in a manner other than it would be normally
required to defend. The basic obligations of the insurer to the insured remain in
effect.").
103. Tank, 38 Wash. App. at 440, 686 P.2d at 1129.
104. MALLEN

& LEVIT, LEGAL

MALPRACTICE 620 (2nd ed. 1981)

[hereinafter

MALLEN & LEVIT] ("Insurance defense counsel routinely and necessarily represent two
clients: insurer and insured."); Williams and Jernberg, Conflicts of Interest in
Insurance Defense Litigation: Common Sense for Changing Times, F.I.C. QUARTERLY
at 111 (Winter 1981) ("The job of defense counsel is to represent both the insurer and
the insured.").
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protect. While not changing the law, this criterion does help
define the role of the insurer-retained defense counsel.
The third criterion is that the insurer must keep the policyholder fully informed of the reservation of rights defense, of
all developments relevant to his policy coverage, and of the
progress of the lawsuit. 105 This, too, is not a unique requirement.1" 6 As the fiduciary of the policyholder, the insurer is
duty-bound to keep the policyholder fully informed, whether a
conflict of interest exists or not. In a conflict situation, it is not
so much the insurer's duty to provide information that
increases as it is the policyholder's need for this information.
When coverage is uncertain or inadequate, the policyholder
must take an active role to protect his interests. The need for
information is increased since the policyholder will have to
07
Depending on the
make informed decisions along the way.
to retain personal
be
may
decisions
nature of the conflict, these
counsel, to demand that the company settle or to settle the
claim with his own funds. The participation of the policyholder might vary but the increased need for information
exists whenever a conflict of interest threatens.
Tank alleged in his suit against State Farm that a settle0
State
ment opportunity was lost for lack of communication.
contribto
willing
was
of
trial,
cost
the
avoid
to
Farm, probably
9
ute up to $5,000.00 to settle the claim.10 While State Farm
mentioned the possible contribution to Tank's insurer-retained
0
attorney, it appears that the attorney did not tell Tank."
Tank alleged that State Farm's failure to tell him of the contribution was a breach of duty. Tank also asserted that this
breach was the cause of the failure to settle because he was
willing to contribute and that the claimant Walker had, in an
affidavit, stated that he might have settled for $10,000.00.111
105. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
106. Hamilton, 83 Wash. 2d 787, 523 P.2d 193.
107. Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 389, 715 P.2d at 1138 ("In a reservation of rights
defense, it is the insured who may pay any judgment or settlement. Therefore, it is
the insured who must make the ultimate choice regarding settlement. In order to
make an informed decision in this regard, the insured must be fully appraised of all
activity involving settlement, whether the settlement offers or rejections come from
the injured party or the insurance company.").
108. Response Brief of Tank and Walker To Brief of Amicus Curiae and State
Farm Fire & Casualty Company, Tank, 105 Wash. 2d 381, 715 P.2d 1133 (Nos. 50994-8,
50933-6).
109. Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 396, 715 P.2d at 1142.
110. Tank, 38 Wash. App. at 441, 686 P.2d at 1130.
111. Id This affidavit was provided to oppose the motion for summary judgment.
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The majority opinion dealt with this argument by saying
that "State Farm fully informed Tank of all developments
regarding policy coverage and the progress of the insured's
lawsuit."' 1 2 The dissent felt that several questions of fact
existed on this issue and stated that "[f]ailure to disclose the
offer of $5,000.00 as a contribution toward settlement prevented the insured from potentially avoiding the $16,000.00
judgment.""' 3 Regardless of the correctness of the decision on
the issue, the court held the insurer to a duty of fully informing the policyholder.
It is not clear whether the insurer's duty is independent of
the defense counsel's duty of full and on-going disclosure to
the policyholder. 1 4 The problem with this criterion is that, if
strictly applied, the insurer might have to independently strive
to keep the policyholder fully informed and not be able to rely
on the defense attorney to perform this function." 5 It is significant that the court imposes on both insurer and defense counsel this duty to fully inform the policyholder. The insurer,
State Farm, told the attorney retained for Tank of the possibility of contribution and may have assumed that the attorney
would inform Tank. Such an assumption may no longer be a
116
valid one for an insurer to make.
The final criterion is that the insurance company "must
refrain from engaging in any action which would demonstrate
a greater concern for the insurer's monetary interest than for
the insured's financial risk.""' 7 The court did not elaborate nor
At this point, Walker had intervened with Tank against State Farm. The only
documented demand by Walker, prior to trial, was for $25,000.00.
112. Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 389, 715 P.2d at 1138.
113. Id. at 396, 715 P.2d at 1142.
114. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
115. This could prove to be a duty that the insurer is not fully capable of
performing. Indeed, the attorney of the policyholder is in a much better position to
fulfill this duty since the attorney will, presumably, be in closer communication with,
his client the policyholder than the insurer, especially in a conflict situation. The duty
of keeping the policyholder informed of the progress of the lawsuit should naturally
fall to the defense counsel, but the court has doubled up on this responsibility.
116. As will be seen, the court did not address the issue of the insurer's vicarious
liability for the acts of the insurer-retained defense counsel. Had it done so, the court
would have had to decide if the defense attorney's alleged failure to inform Tank of
State Farm's willingness to contribute to settlement was negligence, and, if so,
whether the negligence should be attributed to the company. The imposition of a duty
to keep the policyholder independently informed sidesteps the vicarious liability issue
in this narrow sense. If defense counsel failed to adequately inform Tank and State
Farm failed as well, State Farm would be negligent in its own right, not vicariously.
117. Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 389, 715 P.2d at 1137.
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did it give any examples of what behavior would constitute
it did not
such a demonstration. The court simply stated that
118
behavior.
such
exhibited
had
Farm
find that State
The language of this criterion is similar to language used
by courts in excess of limits situations. 11 9 In excess cases, the
insurer is not allowed to demonstrate greater concern for its
own monetary interests by risking the insured's finances in the
hopes of paying less than policy limits. 20 In the case of uncertain coverage, however, the insurer is not, by reserving the
right to later contest coverage, putting its interests ahead of an
insured. Indeed, the insurer is, at its own expense, providing a
defense to a policyholder that may not be insured for that particular claim. The concern of the insurer is to avoid paying
claims that are not covered by the policy.
The language of this final criterion fails to maintain the
necessary distinction between the excess of limits cases and the
uncertain coverage cases. 1 2 1 The use of such language will create doubt whether the appellate court's application of the
excess of limits analysis to this uncertain coverage case was
fully rejected by the supreme court. The distinction must be
maintained or use of the reservation of rights defense will be
discouraged.
Perhaps this criterion should simply be viewed as a "catchall" to deal with unforeseeable misconduct. Certainly, the
courts will not tolerate the insurer structuring the defense 1so
22
as to keep any judgment outside the scope of the policy.

Likewise, the insurer is not allowed to benefit from the ethical
improprieties of the insurer-retained defense counsel. 123 This
criterion could prove troublesome because it is not clear how
the court meant it to be applied.
F.

Duty of the Insurer-ProvidedDefense Counsel

The court in Tank not only formulated specific criteria for
118. Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 398, 715 P.2d at 1138.
119. See, e.g., State Farm v. White, 248 Md. 324, 332, 236 A.2d 269, 273 (1967)
("actions which demonstrate greater concern for the insurer's monetary interest than
the financial risks attendant to the insured's predicament."); Tyler, 3 Wash. App. at
172, 473 P.2d at 197 ("the insurer to give consideration to the interests of the insured
). ..
120. See Tyler, 3 Wash. App. 167, 473 P.2d 193.
121. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
122. See Weber, 4 Wash. App. at 524, 483 P.2d at 159.
123. See Van Dyke, 55 Wash. 2d 601, 349 P.2d 430.
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the insurer but also for the defense counsel retained by the
insurer. "First, it is evident that such attorneys owe a duty of
loyalty to their clients. . . . Second, defense counsel owes a
duty of full and ongoing disclosure to the insured. '124

The attorney owes his loyalty to his client, the policyholder. On appeal, Tank argued that "the attorney retained by
the insurance company is subjected to the pressure of continued employment by the insurance carrier to protect its interest, in opposition to that of the insured.

'12

'

Tank quoted the

Canons of Professional Responsibility to describe the economic
pressure that would be exerted by the "person or organization
that pays or furnishes lawyers to represent others . .

"126

Tank alleged that the insurer-provided attorney conducted the
defense of Tank in such a way that the insurer would not be
called upon to pay any judgment. 1 27 The trial court granted
summary judgment for State Farm 28 and the supreme court
affirmed, pointing out that the insurer had retained an attorney for Tank and a separate attorney to protect its interests.1 29
In addition, the court held that the evidence before it did not
support any allegations of attorney misconduct.1 30
In addition to loyalty, the defense counsel has a duty of
"full and ongoing disclosure" to the policyholder. 31 This duty
of disclosure has three aspects.
First, potential conflicts of interest must be fully disclosed and resolved in favor of the insured. The dictates of
124. Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 388, 715 P.2d at 1137.

125. Brief of Appellant at 14-15, Tank, 38 Wash. App. 438, 686 P.2d 1127 (No. 5526111-4) [hereinafter Brief of Appellant].
126. Id.

at 15 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-23

(1981)).
127. This allegation ignores the fact that, given the pleadings by Walker in the suit
against Tank, State Farm could never have been held to indemnify Tank. Absent an

allegation of negligence, Tank would either be found to have acted in self-defense and,
therefore, not liable, or else to have acted intentionally and, therefore, excluded from
policy coverage.

No tailoring of the defense was necessary in this case since the

insurer would never have to indemnify.
128. Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 385, 715 P.2d at 1135.
129. Id. at 389, 715 P.2d at 1138.

130. The supreme court rejected the use of the deposition of Tank's insurer
provided attorney, as it was not before the trial court at the time of the summary

judgment. Id. at 390, 715 P.2d at 1138. The attorney's deposition helped convince the
appellate court to reverse the summary judgment. Apparently, the attorney stated

that he considered both State Farm and Tank as his clients. Other admissions
regarding the conduct of the defense may have been made as well but the transcript of
the deposition was not before the trial court so the supreme court disallowed it.

131. Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 388-89, 715 P.2d at 1137-38.
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RPC 1.7, which address conflicts of interest such as this,
must be strictly followed. Second, all information relevant
to the insured's defense, including a realistic and periodic
assessment of the insured's chances to win or lose the pending lawsuit, must be communicated to the insured. Finally,
be disclosed to the insured as
all offers of settlement must
132
those offers are presented.
The duty of disclosing and resolving conflicts of interest in
favor of the client was thoroughly analyzed more than 25 years
ago by the supreme court. 133 In Van Dyke v. White, the court

quoted from the Canon of Professional Ethics 6,"3 as well as

from cases outside of Washington 135 to describe the "undeviat6
ing fidelity of the lawyer to his client"'13 in a conflict of interest situation. "The lawyer employed by the insurance company
to represent White owed him undivided loyalty, but he acted
for the [insurer] instead of for White. Such a situation is contrary to public policy."' 3 7 In Tank, the court also calls upon
the Rules of Professional Conduct.3 8 Hence, this duty is not
unique or original.

The duty of providing all relevant information and of disclosing all offers of settlement is not unique but exists as part
132. Id.
133. Van Dyke, 55 Wash. 2d 601, 349 P.2d 430.
134. Canon of Professional Ethics 6 states:
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client
all the circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest in or
connection with the controversy, which might influence the client in the
selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the
meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in
behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another
client requires him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to
divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of
retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any
interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed.
Quoted in Van Dyke, 55 Wash. 2d at 612, 349 P.2d at 437.
135. "Where an insurer's attorney has reason to believe that the discharge of his
duties to his client, the insured, will conflict with his duties to his employer, the
insurer, it becomes incumbent upon him to terminate his relationship with the client."
Van Dyke, 55 Wash. 2d at 612, 349 P.2d at 437 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller, 17
Ill. App. 2d 44, 149 N.E.2d 482 (1958)). See also Hammett v. McIntyre, 114 Cal. App. 2d
148, 249 P.2d 885 (1952).
136. Van Dyke, 55 Wash. 2d at 613, 349 P.2d at 437.
137. Id. at 612, 349 P.2d at 437.
138. Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 388, 715 P.2d at 1137.
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of every attorney's fiduciary duty.'3 9 However, this duty
becomes even more important in a reservation of rights
defense since the policyholder may be ultimately responsible
for paying any judgment or settlement. 4 ° Only by knowing
his chances of prevailing on the liability and coverage issues, as
well as being fully informed of the settlement negotiations, can
the policyholder exploit every opportunity to favorably resolve
the matter.
The criteria described in Tank does not represent a radical
departure from the obligation of the insurer and defense counsel toward the policyholder. However, the description of the
enhanced duty may result in insurer and defense counsel better understanding their roles and duty in the reservation of
rights defense. The analysis of the Tank decision and of the
relationship between insurer, defense counsel, and policyholder is not complete until three collateral issues are
addressed.
G.

The CollateralIssues

The Tank decision does not address three collateral issues
that are fundamental to the interrelationship between insurer,
policyholder and defense counsel. These issues are (1) the ability of the insurer-retained and paid defense counsel to be completely loyal to the policyholder; (2) the insurer's vicarious
liability for the acts of defense counsel; and (3) the issue of
who controls the defense of the policyholder.
1.

The Loyalty of Defense Counsel

Tank asserted that his insurer-retained attorney's first loyalty was to State Farm. 4 ' This argument raises the question of
whether the attorney selected and paid by the insurer can
truly be loyal only to the policyholder in a conflict of interest
situation. Some courts have adopted the view that the insurerretained defense counsel is too close to the company to be loyal
42
to the policyholder against the interests of the company.
139. See Hamilton, 9 Wash. App. at 183, 511 P.2d at 1022.
140. Since the attorney is a fiduciary for the policyholder-client, the duty exists to
keep the client fully informed whether a conflict of interest exists or not. The
attorney must disclose everything relevant to the client, in all situations.
141. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 125, at 14-15.
142. Purdy v. Pacific Automobile Insurance Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 59, 203 Cal. Rptr.
524 (1984); San Diego Navy Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society, 162 Cal.
App. 3d 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1984); USF&G v. Louis Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932 (8th
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These courts deal with this perceived loyalty problem by
allowing the policyholder to select his defense attorney and
requiring the insurer to pay reasonable legal expenses. 1 43 One
court noted that insurers hire relatively few attorneys and a
lawyer not looking out for the company's best interest might
find himself without work.'
Allowing the policyholder to
select "independent" counsel is meant to minimize this
problem.
Other courts have rejected this analysis because of their
belief that the defense bar has been able to comply with its
ethical obligation. 1 45 Thus, the insurer is allowed to select
defense counsel even in the face of conflicting interests.'4 6
The court in Tank did not directly address the issue of
defense counsel's loyalty. The court left the choice of defense
counsel with the insurer since the only way to fulfill the duty
of hiring competent defense counsel is to be able to choose.
However, the court took pains to point out that "both retained
defense counsel and insurer must understand that only the
insured is the client."' 4 7 The court appears to be saying that
the insurer-retained and paid defense counsel can be loyal to
the policyholder once the policyholder has been identified as
the attorney's only client.
2.

The Insurer's Vicarious Liability

The second collateral issue is the insurer's vicarious liability for the acts of the defense counsel. This issue was briefed
by the amicus curiae 48 but the court disregarded the actions of
Tank's insurer-retained attorney as not having been properly
before the court.' 4 Hence, the court was "unable to enter into
any discussion of an insurer's vicarious and direct liability and/
or defense counsel's liability as an independent contractor for
breach of defense counsel's duties as an attorney."150
Cir. 1978); State Farm v. Pildner, 40 Ohio St. 2d 101, 321 N.E.2d 600 (1979) (O'Neal,

C.J., concurring).
143. See Mallen, A New Definition of Insurance Defense Counsel, INSURANCE
COUNSEL J. 109 (Jan. 1986) and cases cited therein.
144. San Diego Navy Federal Credit Union, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 364, 308 Cal. Rptr.
at 498.

145. Siebert Oxidermo Inc. v. Shields, 430 N.E.2d 401 (1982).
146. Id.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 388, 715 P.2d at 1137.
See supra note 3.
See supra note 130.
Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 390, 715 P.2d at 1138.
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Advocates of such vicarious liability declare the insurerretained defense counsel to be the agent of the insurer and,
therefore, any negligence of defense counsel should be imputed
to the insurer. 15 1 Opponents describe defense counsel as an
independent contractor solely responsible for his own acts and
omissions.1 52 If, as the court states, the attorney is to consider
only the policyholder as client in a reservation of rights situation, the agency analysis is weakened. The client, as principal,
should turn to his attorney, as agent, for relief if the attorney
acts improperly, since the attorney is supposed to be independent of the insurer's influence and must act as though the policyholder is paying the bills.
For reasons unknown, Tank did not sue his insurerretained attorney. Had the attorney also been a defendant, the
trial court may have had to look closer at Tank's allegation
that the defense was conducted against Tank's best interest.5 3
In any event, the supreme court was able to avoid the issue of
vicarious liability.
3.

Control of the Defense

The Tank decision fails to address the issue of who controls the defense. When defending unconditionally, the insurer
has complete control of the defense. The company selects
counsel, decides strategy and runs the investigation. 5 4 On the
other hand, when the claim is denied outright, the policyholder
151. It is reasoned that since under the terms of the policy the insurer must
provide a defense, if the quality of the defense is impaired by the acts or omissions of
the attorney the insurer should be responsible. See Amicus Brief W.ST.L.A., supra
note 3, at 26-27. See also Smoot v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 299 F.2d
525, 530 (5th Cir. 1962) ("Those whom the Insurer selects to execute its promises,
whether attorneys, physicians, no less than company-employed adjusters, are its agents
for whom it has the customary legal liability." footnote omitted)).
152. This would appear to be the law in Washington. See Evans v. Steinburg, 40
Wash. App. 585, 588, 699 P.2d 797, 798-99 (1985) ("Even if the defense counsel provided
inadequate representation, Continental would not be vicariously liable for the acts of
the defense attorneys who were acting as independent contractors."). But see
Hamilton, 9 Wash. App. at 190, 511 P.2d at 1026 (Horowitz, C.J., dissenting) ("The
appointed attorney, both as attorney for the insured and as the insurer's agent, must
adequately advise the insured on settlement offers received.").
153. A finding of no insurance coverage by the court should not sustain a
summary judgment in favor of an insurer retained defense attorney that allegedly
committed legal malpractice. Once retained, the attorney must act in the best interest
of the policyholder. The attorney cannot be relieved of his obligation to the client
simply because the insurer is later found not to have had a duty to defend.
154. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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is left on his own and is free to control the litigation. 155 Since a
reservation of rights defense is neither unconditional acceptance of the claim nor outright denial, the question of who controls the defense is raised.
By imposing the duty on the insurer to hire competent
defense counsel, the Tank decision allows the insurer, even in
a reservation of rights defense, to choose the defense counsel
for the policyholder. 15 6 The attorney, once retained, must
begin to make decisions regarding the defense of the policyholder. Normally, the insurer runs the investigation and
decides to what extent discovery should be pursued. Now, the
insurer-retained attorney for the policyholder will want to
make these decisions solely in the interest of his client.
Clearly, the right to control the defense can have a tremendous impact on the coverage question.' 5 7 If the policyholder's
insurer-retained attorney is really to act only for the policyholder, then the attorney has the duty to acquire and maintain
full control of the defense and structure the defense in the
best interest of his client. 58
Given the explicit language of the Van Dyke opinion, the
duty of the insurer-retained defense counsel toward the policyholder has not undergone a real change under the Tank criteria."' The insurer and defense counsel must realize that the
policyholder is the client of the attorney and that the attorney
is duty-bound to work for his client's best interest. 60 The
insurer has investigators and attorneys available to protect its
interests at all times. Since the insurer has undertaken to provide the policyholder with a defense, that defense should be
155. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
157. For examples of structuring the defense in favor of the insurer, see KEETON,
supra note 9, at § 7.7(c) and cases cited therein.
158. Only with complete control of the defense can the policyholder's attorney

fulfill his ethical obligation to the client. Interference by any third party is intolerable.
159. See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
160. In a reservation of rights defense, since the interests of the policyholder will
conflict with the interests of the insurer, the attorney retained by the insurer will be
acting against the insurer's interests. Thus, the insurer should not be surprised if, for
example, the attorney demands that the insurer settle the claim. This, after all, is in
the best interest of the policyholder.
In American Employer's Ins. Co. v. Crawford, 87 N.M. 375, 533 P.2d 1203 (1975),
the court pointed out that the attorney had demanded on behalf of the policyholder
that the company settle. The court indicated that this was to be expected from the
policyholder's attorney and ruled that the company was free to ignore the letter since
it had no duty to indemnify.
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conducted on behalf of the policyholder with the highest
16 1
degree of advocacy.

II.

CONCLUSION

Though no single criterion is new or unique, the Tank criteria as a whole do provide insurer and defense counsel with a
good description of the interrelationship of the parties to a reservation of rights defense. The court left a key part of the reservation of rights defense, that of choosing defense counsel,
with the insurer. Apparently the court was unwilling to further the proposition that insurer-retained defense counsel
could not act independently of the company. This and the
avoidance of the vicarious liability issue might suggest a victory
to some. Yet the fact remains that the court found it necessary
to impose an enhanced obligation of fairness on the insurer
and to backstop the attorney's duty to keep the policyholder
fully informed with an independent duty on the part of the
insurer. This decision does not warrant the term "victory."
Matthew L. Sweeney

161. Such advocacy should not be viewed by the company with disfavor. Any
disfavor would lend weight to the argument that the company can and will exert
pressure on the insurer chosen and insurer paid defense counsel.

